Agent skill
temporal-parameter-staleness
Trigger Pattern interval|period|duration|delay|cooldown|lock_period|timelock|unbonding|claim_delay|withdraw_delay|maturity|ledger_sequence|timestamp - Inject Into Breadth agents, depth-state-trace
Install this agent skill to your Project
npx add-skill https://github.com/PlamenTSV/plamen/tree/main/agents/skills/soroban/temporal-parameter-staleness
SKILL.md
TEMPORAL_PARAMETER_STALENESS Skill (Soroban)
Trigger Pattern:
interval|period|duration|delay|cooldown|lock_period|timelock|unbonding|claim_delay|withdraw_delay|maturity|ledger_sequence|timestampInject Into: Breadth agents, depth-state-trace Finding prefix:[TPS-N]Rules referenced: R2, R8, R10, R13, R14
Cached parameters in multi-step operations become stale when authority changes them between steps. On Soroban, timing has unique properties: env.ledger().timestamp() provides Unix seconds (estimated, can lag wall clock), env.ledger().sequence_number() provides the exact ledger number (strictly monotonic), SCP consensus closes ledgers approximately every 5 seconds, and there is no concept of slots, epochs, or a clock sysvar. TTL (time-to-live) is measured in ledger numbers and can itself act as a timing mechanism.
Step 1: Enumerate Multi-Step Operations
Find all operations that span multiple transactions (ledgers):
| Operation | Step 1 (Initiate) | Wait Condition | Step N (Complete) | Clock Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| {op_name} | {initiate_fn}() | {condition} | {complete_fn}() | ledger_sequence / timestamp |
For each multi-step operation:
- What parameters are read/cached at Step 1 (stored in Persistent/Instance storage)?
- What parameters are re-read at Step N?
- What parameters are used but NOT re-read at Step N?
- Which clock source is used? (
env.ledger().timestamp()vsenv.ledger().sequence_number())
Soroban Clock Semantics
| Clock Source | Type | Resolution | Monotonicity | Accuracy | Typical Use Case |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
env.ledger().sequence_number() |
u32 |
~5s per ledger | Strictly increasing | Exact (validator-produced) | Cooldowns, lock periods, rate-limiting |
env.ledger().timestamp() |
u64 (Unix seconds) |
~5s | Mostly increasing (can lag) | Estimated by SCP; may lag wall clock by seconds to minutes during network stress | Human-readable delays, longer durations |
Critical property: Within a single transaction (a single invocation tree, including sub-invocations via invoke_contract), ALL calls see the same env.ledger() values — there is no intra-transaction timing variation. Multi-step timing attacks require separate ledgers (separate transactions).
Timestamp vs sequence tradeoff:
timestampis human-intuitive (seconds) but can lag real time during validator slowdownssequence_numberis exact but requires converting to human time (~5s per ledger, subject to change if Stellar network parameters change)- Hardcoded
sequence_numberdurations break if Stellar's ledger close time changes (currently ~5s, configurable by validators)
Step 2: Identify Cached Parameters
For each parameter used across steps:
| Parameter | Storage Type + Key | Read At Step | Cached in User State? | Admin-Changeable? | Re-Validated At Completion? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| {param} | {Instance/Persistent, DataKey::Foo} | initiate() | YES/NO | YES/NO (which function) | YES/NO |
Soroban caching patterns:
- Instance storage cache: User's position struct stores a snapshot of config params at initiation time (e.g.,
position.fee_rate = config.fee_rateat deposit time) - Persistent storage cache: Per-user Persistent entry stores the start ledger or timestamp (e.g.,
user_position.start_ledger = env.ledger().sequence_number()) - Re-read pattern: Step N re-reads from Instance storage directly — no staleness for that param
- Allowance TTL as cached permission: An allowance stored in Temporary storage expires by
expiration_ledger— if the operation takes longer than expected, the allowance expires and Step N fails
Red flags: Parameter is cached in user's Persistent entry at Step 1 AND admin can change the source config AND Step N does NOT re-read from source.
Step 3: Model Staleness Impact
For each cached parameter that can become stale:
Scenario A: Parameter INCREASES between steps
1. User initiates at Step 1 — user Persistent entry stores param = X
2. Admin updates Instance config: param = X + delta
3. User completes at Step N — uses cached X from Persistent entry
4. Impact: {what happens with stale X when current config is X + delta}
Scenario B: Parameter DECREASES between steps
1. User initiates at Step 1 — user Persistent entry stores param = X
2. Admin updates Instance config: param = X - delta
3. User completes at Step N — uses cached X
4. Impact: {what happens with stale X when current config is X - delta}
BOTH directions are mandatory — increase and decrease often have different impacts.
Soroban-Specific Staleness Vectors
| Vector | Description | Severity Modifier |
|---|---|---|
| TTL expiry window | User position's Persistent entry expires (archived) during a long multi-step operation. Step N read panics or returns stale default. | HIGH if position data lost; MEDIUM if restorable |
| Ledger sequence drift | Protocol uses hardcoded ledger counts for delays; Stellar network changes average ledger time. Delays become longer or shorter than intended in wall-clock seconds. | Medium if delay is safety-critical (e.g., withdrawal delay shorter than market manipulation window) |
| Timestamp lag | env.ledger().timestamp() lags wall clock during network stress. Tight timestamp comparisons (<60s) may behave unexpectedly. |
Medium if tight comparisons used |
| Config upgraded mid-operation | Admin upgrades contract wasm between Step 1 and Step N. New wasm reads cached params differently. | High — storage layout changes can corrupt cached position |
| Instance TTL expiry | Instance storage (holding config) expires during a long operation. Step N reads config and panics. | MEDIUM — affects all users simultaneously |
Step 3b: Update Source Audit
For each parameter updated from an external source (oracle contract, price feed):
- Is the source the correct representation of what this parameter tracks?
- Is the source contract address validated? Can a fake oracle be substituted via a user-supplied address?
- Should this parameter be fixed for a period (e.g., per epoch cycle) rather than continuously refreshed?
- Which functions update it? Which SHOULD? Any mismatch?
- Is there a
refreshorcrankfunction? Who calls it and when? What is the protocol state if it is never called?
Step 4: Retroactive Application Analysis
For fee/rate parameters that apply to existing state:
| Parameter | Storage Key | Applies To | Retroactive? | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| {fee_param} | {DataKey::FeeBps} | {what it affects} | YES/NO | {if retroactive: who is harmed} |
Soroban retroactive patterns:
- Instance config update: Admin changes
fee_bpsin Instance storage. All pending claims calculated at completion time using new rate — retroactively changes expected returns for users who initiated under old rate. - Cooldown ledger update: Admin changes
cooldown_ledgersin config. Users who initiated cooldown under old value may now need to wait longer or shorter — retroactive effect on in-flight positions. - Rate-at-close pattern: If the protocol reads the current config rate at Step N (not the cached rate from Step 1), any admin change between steps applies retroactively to all pending operations.
Rule 2 direction check: Can the admin's parameter change make a user-facing function behave unexpectedly? (e.g., setting cooldown_ledgers = 0 removes withdrawal protection entirely; setting max_withdrawal = 0 blocks all withdrawals). Does the change retroactively affect users in active positions?
Step 5: Assess Severity
For each staleness issue:
- Who is affected? (single user, all users with pending operations, protocol)
- Is the impact bounded? (capped by parameter range, max delay, etc.)
- Can it be exploited intentionally? (admin or operator timing changes to specific ledgers)
- Is there a recovery path? (cancel and re-initiate, admin override)
- Ledger precision: Given ~5s ledger close time, how precisely can an attacker time the exploitation?
Severity Assessment (Rule 10 — Worst-State)
Use worst realistic operational state, not current on-chain snapshot:
Severity assessed at: pending_claims=MAX_USERS, fee_delta=MAX_FEE-MIN_FEE, tvl=$XXM
Rationale: Protocol designed for up to {N} concurrent pending operations per documentation
Key Questions (must answer all)
- What multi-step operations exist? (initiate/claim, deposit/cooldown/withdraw, propose/execute)
- For each cached parameter: can admin change it between steps?
- What happens if a delay DECREASES after initiation? (users can complete too early relative to new policy)
- What happens if a delay INCREASES after initiation? (users locked longer than originally expected)
- Are fees applied retroactively to existing positions or only to new ones?
- Is there a maximum parameter range that bounds the staleness impact?
- Soroban-specific: Does the protocol use
sequence_numberortimestampfor timing? Iftimestamp, is potential lag handled? - Soroban-specific: Does any Persistent storage entry have a TTL shorter than the longest expected operation? Can it expire mid-operation?
- Soroban-specific: Is there a crank/refresh function? What happens if it is never called?
- Soroban-specific: If the contract is upgraded between Step 1 and Step N, does the new wasm correctly interpret cached values from Persistent storage?
Common False Positives
- Immutable config: If Instance storage has no update function or admin is revoked, no staleness
- Bounded ranges: If min/max bounds limit the change magnitude (enforced on-chain), impact may be Low
- User can cancel: If users can cancel pending operations and re-initiate, reduced severity
- Timelock protection: If parameter changes require a proposal+delay pattern, users have time to react
- Same-transaction operations: Operations completing within a single invocation tree cannot have clock staleness between steps
- Re-read at completion: If Step N re-reads directly from Instance storage (not a cached copy in Persistent), no staleness for that parameter
Instantiation Parameters
{CONTRACTS} - Contracts to analyze
{MULTI_STEP_OPS} - Identified multi-step operations
{CACHED_PARAMS} - Parameters cached at initiation (stored in user Persistent entries)
{ADMIN_PARAMS} - Admin-changeable parameters in Instance storage
{DELAY_PARAMS} - Delay/cooldown parameters (in ledger_sequence counts or timestamp seconds)
{FEE_PARAMS} - Fee/rate parameters that may apply retroactively
{CLOCK_SOURCE} - Clock source used (sequence_number / timestamp)
Output Schema
| Field | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| multi_step_ops | yes | List of multi-step operations found |
| cached_params | yes | Parameters cached across steps (stored in which storage type + key) |
| staleness_vectors | yes | How cached params can become stale |
| retroactive_fees | yes | Fees applied retroactively |
| clock_source_audit | yes | Which clock source is used and whether appropriate |
| ttl_expiry_risks | yes | Storage entries that could expire mid-operation |
| finding | yes | CONFIRMED / REFUTED / CONTESTED |
| evidence | yes | Code locations with line numbers |
| step_execution | yes | Status for each step |
Step Execution Checklist (MANDATORY)
| Step | Required | Completed? | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Enumerate Multi-Step Operations | YES | ||
| 2. Identify Cached Parameters | YES | ||
| 3. Model Staleness Impact (both directions) | YES | ||
| 3b. Update Source Audit | YES | ||
| 4. Retroactive Application Analysis | YES | ||
| 5. Assess Severity | YES |
Cross-Reference Markers
After Step 2: If cached parameters are admin-changeable → MUST complete Step 3 with BOTH increase and decrease scenarios.
After Step 4: Cross-reference with SEMI_TRUSTED_ROLES for admin functions that change these parameters.
After Step 3: If protocol uses timestamp for comparisons tighter than 60 seconds → FLAG clock lag concern.
After Step 1: If any Persistent storage entry has a TTL shorter than the longest expected operation → cross-reference with TTL expiry risk (Step 3 vector: TTL expiry window).
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