Agent skill
performing-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass
Bypasses SSL/TLS certificate pinning implementations in Android and iOS applications to enable traffic interception during authorized security assessments. Covers OkHttp, TrustManager, NSURLSession, and third-party pinning library bypass techniques using Frida, Objection, and custom scripts. Activates for requests involving certificate pinning bypass, SSL pinning defeat, mobile TLS interception, or proxy-resistant app testing.
Install this agent skill to your Project
npx add-skill https://github.com/autohandai/community-skills/tree/main/performing-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass
SKILL.md
Performing Mobile App Certificate Pinning Bypass
When to Use
Use this skill when:
- Mobile app refuses connections through a proxy due to certificate pinning
- Performing authorized security testing requiring HTTPS traffic interception
- Assessing the strength and bypass difficulty of pinning implementations
- Evaluating defense-in-depth of mobile app network security
Do not use to bypass pinning on apps without explicit testing authorization.
Prerequisites
- Burp Suite configured as proxy with listener on all interfaces
- Rooted Android device or jailbroken iOS device
- Frida server running on target device
- Objection installed (
pip install objection) - Target app installed and reproducing the pinning behavior
Workflow
Step 1: Identify Pinning Implementation
Android pinning methods to identify:
1. Network Security Config (res/xml/network_security_config.xml)
<pin-set> with certificate hash pins
2. OkHttp CertificatePinner
CertificatePinner.Builder().add("api.target.com", "sha256/...")
3. Custom TrustManager
X509TrustManager overrides in code
4. Third-party libraries
- TrustKit
- Certificate Transparency checks
iOS pinning methods:
1. NSURLSession delegate (URLSession:didReceiveChallenge:)
2. ATS (App Transport Security) with custom trust evaluation
3. TrustKit framework
4. Alamofire ServerTrustPolicy
5. Custom SecTrust evaluation
Step 2: Bypass with Objection (Quickest Approach)
# Android
objection --gadget com.target.app explore
android sslpinning disable
# iOS
objection --gadget com.target.app explore
ios sslpinning disable
Objection hooks common pinning implementations including OkHttp CertificatePinner, TrustManagerImpl, NSURLSession delegate methods, and SecTrust evaluation.
Step 3: Bypass with Custom Frida Scripts
Android - Universal SSL Pinning Bypass:
// android_ssl_bypass.js
Java.perform(function() {
// Bypass TrustManagerImpl
var TrustManagerImpl = Java.use("com.android.org.conscrypt.TrustManagerImpl");
TrustManagerImpl.verifyChain.implementation = function(untrustedChain, trustAnchorChain,
host, clientAuth, ocspData, tlsSctData) {
console.log("[+] Bypassing TrustManagerImpl for: " + host);
return untrustedChain;
};
// Bypass OkHttp3 CertificatePinner
try {
var CertificatePinner = Java.use("okhttp3.CertificatePinner");
CertificatePinner.check.overload("java.lang.String", "java.util.List").implementation =
function(hostname, peerCertificates) {
console.log("[+] Bypassing OkHttp3 pinning for: " + hostname);
return;
};
} catch(e) {}
// Bypass custom X509TrustManager
var X509TrustManager = Java.use("javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager");
var TrustManager = Java.registerClass({
name: "com.bypass.TrustManager",
implements: [X509TrustManager],
methods: {
checkClientTrusted: function(chain, authType) {},
checkServerTrusted: function(chain, authType) {},
getAcceptedIssuers: function() { return []; }
}
});
// Bypass SSLContext
var SSLContext = Java.use("javax.net.ssl.SSLContext");
SSLContext.init.overload("[Ljavax.net.ssl.KeyManager;",
"[Ljavax.net.ssl.TrustManager;", "java.security.SecureRandom").implementation =
function(km, tm, sr) {
console.log("[+] Replacing TrustManagers in SSLContext.init");
this.init(km, [TrustManager.$new()], sr);
};
// Bypass NetworkSecurityConfig (Android 7+)
try {
var NetworkSecurityConfig = Java.use(
"android.security.net.config.NetworkSecurityConfig");
NetworkSecurityConfig.isCleartextTrafficPermitted.implementation = function() {
return true;
};
} catch(e) {}
console.log("[*] SSL pinning bypass loaded");
});
frida -U -f com.target.app -l android_ssl_bypass.js --no-pause
iOS - Universal SSL Pinning Bypass:
// ios_ssl_bypass.js
if (ObjC.available) {
// Bypass NSURLSession delegate
var resolver = new ApiResolver("objc");
resolver.enumerateMatches(
"-[* URLSession:didReceiveChallenge:completionHandler:]", {
onMatch: function(match) {
Interceptor.attach(match.address, {
onEnter: function(args) {
var completionHandler = new ObjC.Block(args[4]);
var NSURLSessionAuthChallengeUseCredential = 0;
var trust = new ObjC.Object(args[3])
.protectionSpace().serverTrust();
var credential = ObjC.classes.NSURLCredential
.credentialForTrust_(trust);
completionHandler.invoke(NSURLSessionAuthChallengeUseCredential,
credential);
}
});
},
onComplete: function() {}
});
// Bypass SecTrustEvaluate
var SecTrustEvaluateWithError = Module.findExportByName(
"Security", "SecTrustEvaluateWithError");
if (SecTrustEvaluateWithError) {
Interceptor.replace(SecTrustEvaluateWithError, new NativeCallback(
function(trust, error) {
return 1; // Always return true
}, "bool", ["pointer", "pointer"]
));
}
console.log("[*] iOS SSL pinning bypass loaded");
}
Step 4: Handle Advanced Pinning
For apps using advanced pinning (TrustKit, custom binary checks):
# Identify the specific pinning library
frida-trace -U -n TargetApp -m "*[*Trust*]" -m "*[*Pin*]" -m "*[*SSL*]" -m "*[*Certificate*]"
# Hook the identified validation function
# Custom Frida script targeting the specific implementation
Step 5: Verify Bypass Success
After applying the bypass:
- Configure device proxy to Burp Suite
- Open target app and navigate through authenticated flows
- Verify HTTPS traffic appears in Burp Suite HTTP History
- Check for any remaining pinned connections that are not captured
Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Certificate Pinning | Restricting accepted server certificates to a known set, preventing MITM via rogue CA certificates |
| Public Key Pinning | Pinning the server's public key hash rather than the full certificate, surviving certificate rotation |
| Network Security Config | Android XML configuration for declaring trust anchors, pins, and cleartext policy per-domain |
| TrustKit | Open-source library implementing certificate pinning with reporting for both Android and iOS |
| HPKP Deprecation | HTTP Public Key Pinning header was deprecated in browsers but concept persists in mobile apps |
Tools & Systems
- Objection: Pre-built pinning bypass for common libraries (OkHttp, NSURLSession, TrustKit)
- Frida: Custom JavaScript hooks targeting specific pinning implementations
- apktool: APK decompilation for identifying pinning in Network Security Config
- SSLUnpinning (Xposed): Xposed framework module for system-wide pinning bypass on Android
- ssl-kill-switch2: iOS tweak for disabling SSL pinning system-wide on jailbroken devices
Common Pitfalls
- Certificate transparency: Some apps check CT logs in addition to pinning. May need to bypass CT verification separately.
- Multi-layer pinning: Apps may implement pinning at multiple levels (OkHttp + custom TrustManager). Bypass all layers.
- Binary-level pinning: Some apps validate certificates in native C/C++ code, which requires Interceptor.attach at native function addresses rather than Java/ObjC hooks.
- Dynamic pinning updates: Apps using TrustKit or similar may fetch updated pins from a server. Monitor for pin rotation during testing.
Recommended Agent Skills
Expand your agent's capabilities with these related and highly-rated skills.
mapping-mitre-attack-techniques
Maps observed adversary behaviors, security alerts, and detection rules to MITRE ATT&CK techniques and sub-techniques to quantify detection coverage and guide control prioritization. Use when building an ATT&CK-based coverage heatmap, tagging SIEM alerts with technique IDs, aligning security controls to adversary playbooks, or reporting threat exposure to executives. Activates for requests involving ATT&CK Navigator, Sigma rules, MITRE D3FEND, or coverage gap analysis.
hunting-for-spearphishing-indicators
Hunt for spearphishing campaign indicators across email logs, endpoint telemetry, and network data to detect targeted email attacks.
analyzing-malicious-url-with-urlscan
URLScan.io is a free service for scanning and analyzing suspicious URLs. It captures screenshots, DOM content, HTTP transactions, JavaScript behavior, and network connections of web pages in an isolat
implementing-zero-standing-privilege-with-cyberark
Deploy CyberArk Secure Cloud Access to eliminate standing privileges in hybrid and multi-cloud environments using just-in-time access with time, entitlement, and approval controls.
implementing-pam-for-database-access
Deploy privileged access management for database systems including Oracle, SQL Server, PostgreSQL, and MySQL. Covers session proxy configuration, credential vaulting, query auditing, dynamic credentia
detecting-t1003-credential-dumping-with-edr
Detect OS credential dumping techniques targeting LSASS memory, SAM database, NTDS.dit, and cached credentials using EDR telemetry, Sysmon process access monitoring, and Windows security event correlation.
Didn't find tool you were looking for?