container-forensics

Investigates containerized environments for signs of compromise, misconfiguration, or container escape. Covers standalone Docker hosts and Kubernetes clusters. Produces a structured findings document with severity tagging.

Triggers

Alternate expressions and non-obvious activations (primary phrases are matched automatically from the skill description):

• "Falco" / "Tetragon" / "Tracee" → eBPF runtime monitoring tools
• "dive" → Docker image layer analysis
• "crictl" → containerd/CRI-O environment forensics
• "escape" → container escape investigation

Purpose

Container environments introduce unique attack surfaces: privileged containers, host namespace access, writable image layers, and overpermissioned service accounts. Standard host forensics misses these vectors. This skill applies container-aware investigation procedures and maps findings to MITRE ATT&CK for Containers.

Behavior

When triggered, this skill:

1. Detect environment type:

   • Check for Docker: docker info 2>/dev/null
   • Check for Kubernetes: kubectl cluster-info 2>/dev/null or presence of /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/
   • Check for containerd-only (no Docker): ctr version 2>/dev/null
   • Check for CRI-O or containerd via CRI: crictl version 2>/dev/null
   • Determine if running inside a container: check for /.dockerenv, inspect cgroup paths

2. Container inventory and privilege audit:

   • List all containers (running and stopped): docker ps -a --format '{{json .}}'
   • For containerd/CRI-O environments: crictl pods and crictl ps -a
   • Inspect individual containers: crictl inspect <id> (equivalent of docker inspect)
   • List images on CRI nodes: crictl images and crictl inspecti <image-id>
   • Pull container logs via CRI: crictl logs <container-id>
   • Flag containers with dangerous flags:
     • --privileged: docker inspect <id> | jq '.[].HostConfig.Privileged'
     • Host network mode: NetworkMode == "host"
     • Host PID namespace: PidMode == "host"
     • Dangerous capability additions: CapAdd containing SYS_ADMIN, NET_ADMIN, SYS_PTRACE
   • Enumerate bind mounts of sensitive host paths (/, /etc, /var/run/docker.sock, /proc, /sys)

3. Docker — image verification:

   • List all local images with digests: docker images --digests
   • Check image provenance: compare RepoDigests against expected registry
   • Flag images tagged latest without a pinned digest
   • Inspect image build history for suspicious RUN layers: docker history --no-trunc <image>
   • Check for images not associated with any running or stopped container (orphaned images)

4. Image layer analysis with dive:

   • Run dive <image> --ci for non-interactive efficiency and layer summary
   • Identify layers that delete files immediately after downloading them (evidence wiping pattern)
   • Flag layers installing unexpected tooling (curl, nc, nmap, socat, python)
   • Identify unusually large layers inconsistent with the image's declared purpose
   • Check for world-writable permissions set in later layers after a trusted base image

5. Docker — volume and filesystem inspection:

   • List named volumes: docker volume ls
   • Inspect volumes mounted into containers for sensitive data paths
   • Examine container overlay filesystem changes: docker diff <container_id>
   • Flag containers with writable root filesystems where ReadonlyRootfs is false

6. Docker — socket and API exposure:

   • Check if Docker socket is bind-mounted into any container — this grants effective root on the host
   • Check for TCP Docker API exposure: ss -tlnp | grep ':2375\|:2376'
   • Review Docker daemon configuration: /etc/docker/daemon.json

7. Container escape indicators:

   • Processes running in container namespaces that share host PID/network: compare namespace inodes in /proc/1/ns/ vs /proc/<container-pid>/ns/
   • Unexpected cgroup escape patterns in /proc/<pid>/cgroup
   • Files written to host paths from within container overlay mounts
   • runc or containerd-shim process anomalies in host process tree

8. eBPF runtime monitoring:

   • Check for Falco service and alert logs: journalctl -u falco and /var/log/falco.log
   • Review active Falco rules for coverage gaps (shell-in-container, outbound connections, writes below root)
   • Collect Tetragon execution traces via kubectl logs -n kube-system -l app.kubernetes.io/name=tetragon or tetra getevents
   • Review active Tetragon TracingPolicy resources: kubectl get tracingpolicies -A
   • Collect Tracee event logs from container or systemd deployment
   • If no eBPF tooling was active during the incident, document this gap in the findings

9. Kubernetes — cluster-level audit:

   • List all pods across all namespaces: kubectl get pods -A -o json
   • Flag pods running as root: .spec.containers[].securityContext.runAsUser == 0 or unset
   • Flag pods with hostPID, hostNetwork, or hostIPC set to true
   • Flag pods mounting the Docker socket or host paths
   • List privileged containers across the cluster

10. Kubernetes — RBAC audit:

    • List ClusterRoleBindings granting cluster-admin: kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | jq '...'
    • Identify service accounts with wildcard permissions or * verbs on sensitive resources
    • Check for default service account token automounting: automountServiceAccountToken: true
    • List RoleBindings in high-value namespaces (kube-system, kube-public)

11. Kubernetes — pod security and network policy:

    • Check for absent NetworkPolicies (pods with unrestricted egress/ingress)
    • Review PodSecurityAdmission or OPA/Gatekeeper policy coverage
    • List nodes and check for unauthorized node additions: kubectl get nodes -o wide

12. etcd security audit (Kubernetes control-plane only):

    • Verify etcd is not listening on a non-loopback address: ps aux | grep etcd | grep listen-client-urls
    • Confirm --client-cert-auth=true is set in the etcd process flags
    • Check for encryption-at-rest configuration in the API server manifest (--encryption-provider-config)
    • List etcd client certificates in /etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/ and flag any unexpected certs
    • Take a read-only snapshot with etcdctl snapshot save for offline analysis
    • Enumerate etcd key paths for secrets and serviceaccount tokens using etcdctl get / --prefix --keys-only

13. K8s API server audit log analysis (if audit logging is enabled):

    • Locate audit log path from kube-apiserver.yaml (--audit-log-path)
    • Summarize request activity by user and verb to identify outliers
    • Detect anonymous (system:anonymous) API calls to non-public endpoints
    • Flag ServiceAccount tokens used outside their home namespace
    • Identify bulk list/get on secrets resources (credential harvesting pattern)
    • Flag exec subresource calls from non-operator users during the incident window
    • Detect rapid create/delete sequences on the same resource (attacker covering tracks)

14. Write findings document:

    • Save to .aiwg/forensics/findings/container-forensics.md
    • Group by: Docker/containerd findings, eBPF runtime events, Kubernetes findings, etcd/API server findings, escape indicators
    • Tag each finding: INFO, SUSPICIOUS, MALICIOUS

Usage Examples

Example 1 — Docker host

docker investigation

Audits the local Docker daemon.

Example 2 — Kubernetes cluster

kubernetes forensics

Requires kubectl configured with appropriate credentials.

Example 3 — Inside a container

container forensics

Detects the container context and adjusts collection accordingly.

Output Locations

• Findings: .aiwg/forensics/findings/container-forensics.md
• Raw Docker inspection: .aiwg/forensics/evidence/docker-inspect.json
• crictl inspection output: .aiwg/forensics/evidence/crictl-inspect.json
• K8s pod manifest dump: .aiwg/forensics/evidence/k8s-pods.json
• Falco alert log: .aiwg/forensics/evidence/falco-alerts.log
• Tetragon events: .aiwg/forensics/evidence/tetragon-events.json
• Tracee events: .aiwg/forensics/evidence/tracee-events.json
• etcd snapshot: .aiwg/forensics/evidence/etcd-snapshot-<timestamp>.db
• K8s API server audit log (copy): .aiwg/forensics/evidence/k8s-audit.log

Configuration

container_forensics:
  dangerous_capabilities:
    - SYS_ADMIN
    - NET_ADMIN
    - SYS_PTRACE
    - SYS_MODULE
  sensitive_host_paths:
    - /
    - /etc
    - /var/run/docker.sock
    - /proc
    - /sys
    - /root
  high_value_namespaces:
    - kube-system
    - kube-public
    - default

References

• @$AIWG_ROOT/agentic/code/addons/aiwg-utils/rules/research-before-decision.md — Detect environment type (Docker, containerd, Kubernetes) before applying collection procedures
• @$AIWG_ROOT/agentic/code/frameworks/forensics-complete/rules/non-destructive.md — Do not stop or remove containers until all artifacts are collected and hashed
• @$AIWG_ROOT/agentic/code/frameworks/forensics-complete/rules/red-flag-escalation.md — Escalate immediately when container escape, Docker socket exposure, or privileged escape is confirmed
• @$AIWG_ROOT/agentic/code/frameworks/forensics-complete/rules/evidence-integrity.md — Hash container logs and filesystem exports immediately after collection
• @$AIWG_ROOT/agentic/code/frameworks/forensics-complete/skills/linux-forensics/SKILL.md — Investigate the underlying host after container forensics; container escapes leave traces on the host